The issue of economies of scale and scope in research is arguably as old as research itself. Recently, however, deep changes in the way we organize research and an improved understanding of the relationship between research and growth have rekindled interest in the subject. A case in point is the concept of the European Research Area (ERA), which appears to be founded on the implicit understanding that economies of scale and scope matter in research funding and execution and that coordination and collaboration (at various levels) are therefore beneficial, whereas fragmentation and dispersal are inefficient. Hence the emphasis on 'critical mass'.
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The issue of economies of scale and scope in research is arguably as old as research itself. Recently, however, deep changes in the way we organize research and an improved understanding of the relationship between research and growth have rekindled interest in the subject. A case in point is the concept of the European Research Area (ERA), which appears to be founded on the implicit understanding that economies of scale and scope matter in research funding and execution and that coordination and collaboration (at various levels) are therefore beneficial, whereas fragmentation and dispersal are inefficient. Hence the emphasis on 'critical mass'.
The rest of the chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 1 defines scale and scope economies in research and identifies reasons why empirical verification of such effects may be fraught with difficulties. Section 2 traces the extensive literature on the neo-Schumpeterian hypotheses that laid the foundation for the modern discussion on scale and scope effects in research. Section 3 introduces cooperative research as a reaction to a perceived need for correcting market failure and the inadequacies of individual organizations to go it alone. The section also describes how assumptions of research cooperation are built on the concepts of economies of scale and scope. Finally, Section 4 concludes by relating the discussion on scale and scope, and the related need for government intervention, to the evolution of the European Framework Programmes for Research and the development of the ERA.
BASIC CONCEPTS: ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE IN RESEARCH1
In this section, definitions are built. Unless otherwise indicated, the following terms are used. 'Output' refers to the outputs of research, such as new concepts, ideas, products, services and production processes and their (imperfect) measures, such as publications, reports, patents, blueprints and prototypes/pilots. 'Production' refers to the transformation of research inputs into research outputs. 'Inputs' refers to the resources GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11984 -EE -DELANGHE:M2017 -DELANGHE PRINT utilized in this production process, including both labour (researchers, support personnel) and capital (research equipment and infrastructure). 'Technique' (or 'production technique') refers to the specific technology utilized in this transformation of research inputs into research outputs. In other words, it refers to the specific organizational/managerial structure that is utilized to achieve the most efficient transformation (largest amount of research output from a given level of research inputs).
There are several techniques that can be utilized to achieve a certain kind and amount of research output. The choice will depend on both internal factors -capabilities and resources of the organization or group of organizations that undertake the research -and external factorsrelative prices (availability) of inputs, norms in science and technology, external environment (for example, social acceptability of the research) and government policy (for example, regulation). The choice of technique and capacity level represents a long-run decision when all inputs are variable. However, once a certain type of research project of a certain size is put in place, the research enterprise operates under short-term conditions. How easy it is to switch techniques and/or the size of the research project depends on the nature of the research itself.
Scale effects may be present at several levels: the research project, the organization, the group of organizations (if cooperative project) and the geographical area (country, region). The concept of returns to scale is used to describe what happens to output when all inputs are increased together (by the same proportion) when a specific technique is in place. An increase in all inputs resulting in a more than proportional increase in research output indicates increasing returns to scale. Increases of the same proportion mean constant returns to scale. If the research output increases by a smaller proportion than all of the research inputs, we have decreasing returns to scale.
Economic theory offers three possible reasons for increasing returns to scale: specialization, dimensional effects and indivisibilities. Specialization implies a finer division of labour as the research project grows larger. Dimensional effects refer to the case where a larger unit of capital produces disproportionately more than a smaller unit. Indivisibilities exist when certain inputs are available only in certain minimum sizes: larger research scales may utilize such inputs more efficiently. For instance, professional management could be such an input. On the other hand, the prevailing reason for decreasing returns is the coordination and control complications of large-size operations.
Under the assumption that all inputs are in perfectly elastic supply to the organization, the scale effects above translate into cost effects: increasing returns are reflected into economies of scale -decreasing long-term GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11984 -EE -DELANGHE:M2017 -DELANGHE PRINT GRA average cost -whereas decreasing returns to scale are reflected into diseconomies of scale -increasing long-term average cost. Economies of scope are present when the same one research operation deals with several subjects because of cost advantages. Economies of scope in research may result in situations where several research projects involve at least some of the same management and science and technology (S&T) knowledge, skills and capital equipment, thus allowing for crossfertilization and productive exchange. Economies of scope are distinct from economies of scale. Similarly, diseconomies of scope are unrelated to diseconomies of scale.
The extent of cost savings from joint research can be shown with the following example:
where:
C(R m ) is the cost of undertaking R m units of research in mobile phones alone; C(R s ) is the cost of undertaking R s units of research in mobile phone software alone; C(R m 1 R s ) is the cost of undertaking these two types of research jointly.
If ES > 0 economies of scope exist. If ES < 0 then diseconomies of scope exist. The latter are most likely to occur when the proliferation of different research subjects becomes so great that the task of coordinating and controlling the research process (transformation) leads to diminishing returns to management. That is, it would be more efficient if different research subjects were undertaken by different independent organizations.
Occasionally one comes across the term 'economies of complementarity' used to indicate cost savings across research projects due to synergies, knowledge transfer, cross-fertilization of ideas between individuals/teams and the like. Economies of complementarity are important, especially for 'virtual' research enterprises such as those described in Section 3 that combine two or more independent organizations pursuing collaboratively specific outcomes. However, economic theory does not clearly differentiate such concepts and we will consider them in this chapter as part of economies of scope.
While scale and scope effects have been discussed separately above, in practice they frequently occur simultaneously and are difficult to identify empirically. On the one hand, the input-output relationships at varying sizes of the research enterprise turn out to be much more complicated than implied by simple microeconomic theory. In particular, aspects of research management practice and technique greatly complicate the picture. Consider, for instance, generic, applied and development research in different sectors by different sizes and types of organizations or groups of organizations. On the other hand, established cost accounting systems, designed for different purposes, obscure the existence of these effects in the level of detail in which we are interested. Difficulties include:
Research output differentiation.
• The cost disadvantages of a smaller-scale research enterprise may be offset by differentiation of the research outputs in ways that achieve much higher prices for them -for instance, high value-added niche markets. Hence, the coexistence in the same technology areas of research enterprises of very different sizes. Differences between sectors and technology areas.
• In the presence of significant economies of scale in research, one would expect the size of competing research enterprises to grow and competition to be of classic oligopolistic nature. Such a strategy could, however, prove fatal in the presence of new techniques coming from outside the narrow confines of the industry in question. A case in point is the pharmaceutical industry and the biotechnology revolution. Different inputs and techniques.
• Only rarely, if ever, would a large research enterprise resemble -in terms of inputs, structure and techniques -a much smaller research operation. Therefore, the concept of capital-labour ratios requiring uniform capital and labour units becomes questionable. Equipment and labour skills are usually commensurate with particular scales of the research operation. Broad ranges of efficient research output.
• In the presence of constant returns to scale in research, the long-term average cost curves are flat rather than U-shaped as required by economies and diseconomies of scale. The shape and position of short-term cost curves will then be the result of managerial decisions and the influence of particular characteristics of the research operation/project in question.
Imbalances among different stages of research.
• Imbalances among the different stages of the research enterprise may be the result of deliberate managerial decisions rather than indivisibilities in capital equipment. Excess capacity may be built into the design of a research operation due to anticipated needs. For instance, it is well understood that the cost of successive stages of research -from more basic to applied, development, prototyping -increases in a geometric progression. Research managers may build excess capacity in the earlier (less costly) stages of research and tolerate the cost of parallel projects in competing approaches in order to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible before moving closer to market.
Research output mix.
• The concept of economies of scope does not take into consideration the demand side, that is, the possibility that a research enterprise is set up to respond to different kinds of research output mixes. This requires some flexibility built into the system, which may make it appear less cost-efficient than what it could be if it were to serve exclusively the current research output mix. Pre-emptive investment in research scale.
• Occasionally, an organization or group of organizations may invest in a level of research capacity beyond what is currently needed. The reason is dynamic and strategy related: competitors, current and prospective, may be discouraged by the existence of idle excess capacity that can be used quickly when the opportunity arises. They may thus decide to abandon plans for expansion of existing, or establishment of new, research operations in an existing market. Scale and technological change.
• Efficient scale requirements drastically change over time according to the features of existing technology. This works at two levels. On the one hand, there are very extensive differences across sectors and technological areas. There is, for instance, hardly any resemblance of scale and structure among research operations in the chemical industry and mobile telephony. Even within the same broad sector, there are quite significant differences -see bulk and speciality chemicals. On the other hand, minimum efficient scales of research will change dramatically within the same sector at different stages of the sector's evolution, typically getting larger as the sector matures, products become more standardized and research opportunities decrease. Scope and technological change.
• Opportunities of economies of scope and complementarity will also differ across technology areas and will change over time on the basis of technology evolution. This creates significant room for managerial intervention and strategic considerations.
NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN HYPOTHESES
Schumpeter made a distinction between invention and innovation but in his later work considered that both were becoming more 'mechanistic'. He was deeply interested in the dynamics and mechanisms of this change. Long-term economic growth was argued to be based on radical technological advancement whereby successive industrial revolutions resulted in the qualitative transformation of the economy rather than on the simple quantitative growth of extant industries. 'Gales of creative destruction' described the onslaught of waves of radical technological advancement. Generated by entrepreneurial actors, technological innovations would lead to both winners and losers. As the new wave of innovation starts replacing an older one, firms come under competitive threats that eventually destroy established positions. The implication for government policy is that it must deal with a system in constant flux.
Perfect competition seemed untenable and, probably, not desirable because although it could allocate resources efficiently at any point in time it would stifle the kind of activity that would allocate resources most efficiently over time.
2 A firm could restrict its output and capture supernormal profits, at least temporarily, without causing a loss to the economic system. Firms may do so as a strategic response to the market and technological uncertainties created by the anticipated waves of technological change. Schumpeter (1912 Schumpeter ( , 1942 was principally interested in the differences between the innovative activities of small, flexible, entrepreneurial firms and those of larger, diversified, professionally managed corporations with formal research and development (R&D) departments. While he never really formulated strong, testable hypotheses, followers of his work have extracted such hypotheses from fragments in his writings and put them to empirical test. The empirical literature has tried to test the so-called neoSchumpeterian hypotheses that focus on the effects of monopoly power and large size on innovative efforts. Two main hypotheses were formulated and empirically tested:
Hypothesis 1: Monopoly Power and Innovative Activity are Positively Related
Considerations of both ex post market power (anticipated to follow innovation) and ex ante market power (existing before the innovation) underline this hypothesis. On the one hand, firms must anticipate some form of (at least transient) market power, and the consequent realization of extraordinary profits, in order to invest in R&D in the first place. On the other hand, an oligopolistic structure in the market where the investing company already operates may favour innovation because: (1) the firm may feel able to extend monopoly power in current product markets to future product markets; (2) supernormal profit enables the firm to respond faster to the innovative efforts of its rivals (which may also operate as a deterrent in the first place); (3) oligopolistic market structure facilitates knowledge of rival behaviour; (4) the availability of internal financial resources greatly facilitates both undertaking risky research projects and hiring the best and most innovative people. Ex ante market power also has potential disadvantages for innovation: (1) the monopolist may be more concerned with protecting its current position than with acquiring a new one; (2) the monopolist may be slower in bringing innovative technology online if it replaces existing technologies; (3) the monopolist may regard additional leisure as superior to additional profits (X-inefficiency).
The theoretical answer to the question of the optimal level of monopoly power is that the marginal sacrifice in static efficiency resulting from a departure from perfect competition must equal the marginal social benefit from increased innovative activity.
Hypothesis 2: Firm Size and Innovative Activity are Positively Related
Large firms may have an advantage in innovation over small firms if: (1) innovative activity is becoming more expensive as Galbraith (1952) argued; (2) there are economies of scale and scope in research because researcher productivity increases with the number of colleagues they have to interact with, because researchers are specialized and must rely on the expertise of colleagues and because of the superior ability of large, diversified firms to exploit the output of their research internally (Nelson, 1959) . Firm size may also have disadvantages for innovation: (1) as firms grow large, R&D efficiency is undermined due to coordination problems and loss of managerial control; (2) employee motivation ebbs as the direct link between scientists and entrepreneurs breaks and the ability to benefit directly from innovation diminishes.
The neo-Schumpeterian hypotheses attracted significant attention from applied microeconomists, who have tested them empirically for several decades. It must be stressed that such tests have met with significant difficulties regarding the identification of the innovation, the definition of the inputs into the innovation process, the measurement of firm size, the measurement of monopoly power and the undetermined nature of the direction of causality among the variables being studied.
The most persistent finding of the empirical literature on the first hypothesis is that the effect of concentration on research intensity depends upon other industry conditions such as technological opportunity, appropriability, technological uncertainty and market and finance conditions (Comanor, 1967; Scherer, 1967; Shrieves, 1978; Scott, 1984 , Levin et al., 1985 Wedig, 1990) .
Schumpeter, however, also argued that the expectation of market power acquired by successful innovation provides an important incentive to undertake inventive activity. Studies have been undertaken to examine whether the ability of firms to appropriate the returns from an innovation encourages R&D investment (Cohen et al., 1987; Levin et al., 1987) . Moreover, the idea that market structure is a function of the technology life cycle (or product cycle) has been studied, focusing attention on the conditioning role of the product and technology life cycle (Freeman and Soete, 1997; Tassey, 1997 Tassey, , 2007 . Early in the cycle, high technological opportunity stimulates entry, but as the product matures, entry falls off, concentration increases and innovation shifts to more incremental process innovation.
All in all, the only simple conclusion to be drawn from this literature is that the links between market structure, innovation and economic welfare are extremely complex (Scherer, 1992) . The relationship between R&D intensity/innovativeness and market structure depends on numerous other factors affecting the industry, the firm and the technology. The most important of these appear to be appropriability, technological opportunity and demand structure.
There has been significant controversy over the relationship between firm size and innovation. Most tests have actually focused on the impact of the former on the latter. As with the hypothesis on innovation and market structure, however, there seems to be simultaneity: not only may firm size have an effect on the rate of innovation, the reverse must be happening at the same time too. While there is, by now, considerable statistical information on the topic, a good part of it relates to research expenditures or patents rather than innovation, which introduces problems of interpretation (Freeman and Soete, 1997) . Several study limitations have been pointed out (Cohen, 1995) :
Inventive activity has been measured by inputs • or outputs. There is no perfect correlation between the two, however, making the interpretation of results difficult (Fisher and Temin, 1973) . Selection bias: typically only the most successful firms are
Wide variation between studies with respect to their control for • various firm characteristics. Hypothesized factors have included cash flow, degree of diversification, complementary capabilities, economies of scale in research and the ability to spread research costs over output. Yet one cannot easily find direct examinations of whether the relationship between size and research is due to any of these factors. Industry effects, such as technological opportunity, have also been
• widely reputed to impact upon the relationship between firm size and innovativeness. Studies that have tried to control for industry effects show that R&D rises more than proportionately with size (for example, Comanor, 1967) or that inventive activity measured in terms of either inputs or outputs increased more than proportionally with size up to a threshold, whereupon the relationship became basically proportional (Scherer, 1965; Philips, 1971; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982) . Still, such results have been disputed. Data limitations make it difficult to control for industry effects. Most
• larger firms are aggregations of business units engaged in a variety of industries. Using two-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classification)-level data introduces measurement error to the extent that relevant industry characteristics vary across the four-digit industries that make up the two-digit data. Schumpeter's hypotheses usually make more sense at the level of the business unit rather than at the firm level for large diverse firms (Scherer, 1984; Levin et al., 1987) . If it exists, the relationship between size and innovation is probably
• non-monotonic. Threshold effects may be present at the business unit level (Cohen et al., 1987) or at the firm level (Bound et al., 1984; Pavitt et al., 1987) . But the threshold effect has not remained unchallenged. Studies like Acs and Audretch (1990) have shown that smaller manufacturing firms accounted for a disproportionately large share of innovations relative to their size and that R&D productivity defined as innovations per unit of R&D tends to decline with firm size. Recent experience with innovation in heavily entrepreneur-based industries such as information and communications technology sectors (particularly service-oriented ones such as Internet and mobile communications), biotechnology and new materials has also tended to corroborate the concept that smaller, entrepreneurial firms and larger, diversified firms are relatively more innovative, depending on the sector.
The frequent reversal of results and uncertainty has led to a search for other firm-level determinants of innovative effort. These may include good management, working relationships and intra-firm communication. Analysing firm-level capabilities, however, demands a high degree of understanding of the underlying technologies and other activities within a firm or industry. This has been pursued extensively with examples of studies such as automobile manufacturing, computers and semiconductors, photolithographic alignment equipment, industrial automation, chemicals, energy, biotechnology, software, the Internet and other service sectors (Barras, 1986; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Henderson, 1993; Carlsson, 1995; Mowery and Nelson, 1999; OECD, 2000; Steil et al., 2002) .
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Another determinant may be cash flow, seen as a measure of the availability of internal funds for R&D (Grabowski, 1968; Antonelli, 1989) . Schumpeter implied that capital markets are imperfect, so the firm would rely on internal funding for its innovative efforts. Many of these studies found that cash flow was positively associated with higher levels of R&D activity.
A third alleged determinant is company diversification. The idea here is that a diversified firm is better able to exploit research results. In addition, large, diversified firms are able to exploit the complementarities in their non-research activities with their research activities as well. Scherer (1965) found that an index of diversification was highly significant. Later studies (Grabowski, 1968; Grabowski and Mueller, 1978; Scott and Pascoe, 1987) had ambiguous results.
It would be fair to say that the empirical results regarding the relationship of firm size and innovativeness are inconclusive. Perhaps the conjecture of Jewkes et al. (1958) remains as true as ever: 'It may be that there is no optimal size of firm but merely an optimal pattern for any industry, such as distribution of firms by size, character and outlook to guarantee the most effective gathering together and commercially perfecting of the flow of new ideas' (p. 168).
It can be concluded that while the empirical investigation of the neoSchumpeterian hypotheses provides a useful introduction to our subject matter, it has not managed to decisively answer the specific question of policy decision-makers and strategists on the existence of economies of scale, scope and complementarity in research and in innovation. If anything, this rather extensive literature points to a heavily qualified answer: the existence or not of such economies heavily depends on the nature of the technical endeavour at hand, the related technological opportunity and appropriability, the stage of the technology cycle and the demand characteristics. In other words, expect differences across sectors/ technology areas and through time.
COOPERATIVE RESEARCH
An important limitation of the classic discussion on scale and scope effects in research for today's environment is the concentration on individual organizations. One of the most striking features of industrial innovation today is that only a small minority of firms can innovate alone. Most technological advances and significant innovations involve a multitude of organizations. This is especially the case for the most valuable, most knowledge-intensive and most complex technologies. The past three decades have witnessed an explosion of cooperative innovation agreements involving firms, universities and other research institutes in various combinations.
Adapting to an environment of high risks, global competition, increasing complexity of technological advances and rapid generation and diffusion of technical knowledge and know-how, a large number of firms have opted for cooperative relationships. In the presence of technological development that involves a greater array of product and process systems, subsystems and components, no single firm can deploy all of the requisite capabilities and assets at reasonable cost. In this context, a network can serve as a locus for innovation because, for any network member, it provides timely access to external knowledge and resources that are otherwise unavailable, while also testing internal expertise and learning abilities (Powell et al., 1996) . Linkages within innovation networks are very complex, involving not only diverse kinds of formal contracts, but also informal exchanges of knowledge, thus increasing opportunities for knowledge transmission.
Innovation networks involve not only a wide variety of organizations, but also a wide range of activities including joint ventures, research corporations, joint R&D (for example, research pacts, joint development agreements), technology exchange agreements (for example, technology sharing, cross-licensing, mutual second-sourcing), direct investment, minority/cross-holding, customer-supplier relations, R&D contracts, one-directional technology flow agreements (licensing, second-sourcing), manufacturing agreements, marketing agreements and service agreements. The terms 'strategic alliance' and 'strategic partnership' are often used to describe the building blocks of innovation networks.
Innovation networks are increasingly regarded as the dominant organizational mode in the knowledge-based economy. This has created a proliferation of literature with several special issues and individual papers on alliances and networks appearing in the past several years in journals such as Organization Science, Organization Studies, International Studies of Management and Organizations, Strategic Management Journal, Research Policy and World Development. Yet besides case studies, we have few systematic indicators of the nature and dynamics of these innovation networks. Moreover, there remains a great deal of debate about the factors underpinning network formation and evolution. The basic rationale for cooperative research in economics has rested on traditional market failure arguments emphasizing insufficient incentives for individual firms to undertake uncertain and imperfectly appropriable research at the socially optimal level. Business arguments have focused on the organization and its strategic considerations such as better access to resources, capabilities and markets and the creation of new GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11984 -EE -DELANGHE:M2017 -DELANGHE PRINT strategic options (Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Hemphill and Vonortas, 2003) . Frequently mentioned advantages of research partnerships for private sector partners include: R&D cost-sharing;
• reduction of R&D duplication, research synergies;
• risk-sharing, uncertainty reduction;
• knowledge spillover internalization;
• easier access to finance; • To the extent that the relevant unit of analysis has shifted from the individual organization to the consortium or network, the conceptualizations of scale and scope in the economic literature must be recast. The relevant research resources, capabilities and strategies are no longer those of the individual organization but those of the group. The research question then becomes whether the incremental benefits obtained by a larger and more inclusive network through the leveraging of larger pools of resources and capabilities overcome the incremental cost of increased coordination needs and ebbing motivation.
At the project level, a large consortium or a large budget would, in principle, be associated with improved performance. In terms of both scientific and technological outputs, the efforts and skills of multiple partners in an R&D project would lead to a larger pool of resources and expertise and hence would, ceteris paribus, increase the likelihood for success (Schilling, 2005) . Equally important, a large consortium, composed of carefully chosen participants, would increase the heterogeneity of resources pooled together for project use. Increased heterogeneity in skills and experiences among project participants may foster creative problem-solving, promote learning and new knowledge creation, and may thus increase the likelihood of project success. 4 Unfortunately, large consortia also have a negative side: the administrative and coordination costs of running the project also increase with size. In addition, large numbers of participants may bring a greater likelihood of social loafing and free-riding, thereby decreasing the extent of learning (Wong, 2004) and hence the likelihood of project success.
5
The trade-off between these effects will have a direct bearing on the consortium's absorptive capacity, that is, the set of capabilities relevant to the acquisition, assimilation, transformation and exploitation of knowledge to finally produce marketable, innovative results.
6
For our purpose, an important consideration is that network structure is emergent in the initial conditions of a specific industry, including the inherent characteristics of the relevant technologies and the norms and institutional factors that help generate rules that guide the competitive/ cooperative behaviour of firms in that industry. There seems to be a fundamental trade-off in network structure between organizational stability and variety. The effort to maintain and strengthen the prevailing relationships tends to freeze the structure of interactions into stable patterns. The more stable the patterns of interaction become, however, the more the network acquires the characteristics of a firm's organization, that is, the more it strives for specialization and the less capable it grows to achieve its fundamental objective of providing variety.
Network structure optimality will, at least in part, depend on whether the predominant mode of operation in an industry concentrates on the better exploitation of existing technologies, skills and information or on the exploration of emerging innovations and other changes. Both processes are often needed and pursued simultaneously and compete for limited resources within individual organizations. The optimal allocation of resources among the two will depend on the internal conditions of the firm (resources, capabilities, strategic inclination) and on environmental factors relating to industry characteristics, including both the demand side (conditions for market development) and the supply side (technological opportunity, appropriability, competitive conditions).
Analysts have argued for high-density and strong ties for exploitation and for low-density and weak ties for exploration (Rowley et al., 2000) . Others have reached the opposite conclusion by using bounded rationality arguments: in dynamic environments with frequently changing conditions and continuous learning by companies, the efficiency of transferring information through bridges in existing networks while avoiding duplication of contacts is argued to become less relevant than openness of contacts, network density and tie redundancy (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) . Still others argue somewhere in-between (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005) : dense networks, redundant ties and variable tie strengths are expected in the case of exploration; less dense, more stable network structures and non-redundant ties are anticipated for exploitation. Moreover, hybrid network forms are anticipated in transitions from exploration to exploitation in the development of a dominant design.
In sum, the question of scale and scope in collaborative industrial structures is far from settled. At the level of individual collaborative research projects, it is somewhat easier to tell but the answer will be qualified on the basis of the technology and its projected use. Generalizations are hard to make at this point.
SCALE AND SCOPE FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RESEARCH
Public support for science, technology and innovation has been justified by economists on the basis of market failures and system failures. Market failure requires that the social returns to research investment exceed the private returns to the individual organization undertaking the investment. Principal among the culprits are said to be imperfect appropriability and uncertainty. Underinvestment by the private sector is to be expected as a result, raising the need for public investment to achieve a socially optimal level of research effort.
More recently, analysts have also vigorously promoted the idea of system failures due to the complexity of scientific and technological advancement and innovation. For instance, one can argue for the existence of ëlock-iní in some technological trajectory, even though an alternative path of technological development might be more efficient. Public intervention may be necessary to make the transition. Or, one can argue for government intervention on the basis of institutional constraints on the utilization and diffusion of knowledge. In addition to supporting the generation of new knowledge, significant weight must be given to more effective institutional arrangements for its transfer. As a result of the systemic nature of innovation, there are many feedback loops between the various stages of the innovation process. Government intervention may be justified to avoid coordination and institutional failures. The government also has an important role in providing the necessary investments in human capital and in mechanisms to intensify the flows and absorption of knowledge.
The issue of investment timing, in particular, has gained attention in the presence of shrinking technology life cycles. Technologies appear, mature and become obsolete in a series of evolutionary phases, which greatly affect R&D decisions. An important economic factor is, therefore, the timing of R&D investments relative to the evolution of a technology. The timing issue has two dimensions: investment decisions directed at attaining market share within a technology's life cycle and those focused on making the transition between life cycles. The transition between two generic technology life cycles presents significant complications. The greater the differences between two generations of a technology, the greater the investment risk for individual companies. Transitions to new technology life cycles typically demand different sets of research skills than those of incumbent firms. Incumbents will tend, then, to assign higher technical and market risk valuations to the prospective research program, with the result that necessary investments are postponed.
7 This creates a gap, the argument goes, which requires government intervention.
Policy thinking regarding research in the European Union has arguably tended to progress from the traditional understanding of market failure to concepts of systemic failure and related scale and scope effects. This may be manifested by the increasing attention not only to collaborative R&D but to the broader concept of the ERA and its vision for increasing coordination among national and regional research policies as well as between research and regional development policies. It also seemingly underlies the philosophy of the Framework Programmes for Research. The justification of the first three or four Framework Programmes primarily reflected market failure arguments based on the need to support pre-competitive research of generic applicability across the Community. The main funding instrument was targeted cooperative research projects of limited time duration. The thinking underlying more recent Framework Programmes, however, has moved visibly towards the arguments of systemic failure. This trend started somewhat shyly with the 5th and moved forward visibly with the 6th and 7th Framework Programmes that have endorsed new funding instruments in research such as integrated projects, Networks of Excellence and Joint Technology Initiatives to advance whole technology platforms.
The systemic approach to policy intervention includes notions of scale and scope but it is broader than just these. It calls for a tall research agenda of immediate applicability. Defining and empirically substantiating concepts of critical mass, especially as they relate to collaborative research efforts involving broad networks of participants and stakeholders, becomes of utmost priority. NOTES 1. We draw on the discussion on returns to scale, scope and learning regarding regular production techniques in Rosegger (1996) . 2. This argument is, of course, predicated on the denial of a steady-state condition of an economy: in a stationary state, immediate optimization is synonymous with long-run optimization. 3. For reviews see Powell and Grodal (2005) , Malerba and Vonortas (2009) and Chapter 9 of this book. 4. This relates to the notion of technological cognitive distance among project participants (Nooteboom et al., 2007) .
5. There has been evidence, for example, that the most successful alliances are those between firms with similar technological foci and/or operating in similar markets, whereas in contrast, distant firms find it difficult to cooperate effectively (Stuart, 1998) . This is not a foreclosed subject, however. 6. Zahra and George (2002) building on the work of Cohen and Levinthal (1990) . 7. This enhances the dominant firms' tendency to avoid jeopardizing profitable production lines in the prevailing technology life cycle.
